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OGDEN AUTO BODY FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF 
AND ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER THE "COMING 
AND GOING" EXCLUSION APPLIES IN THE PRESENT CASE 
A. Summary of primary and responsive arguments. 
In his opening brief, Appellant/Plaintiff Alan Hoskins, Jr. argued that the 
trial court committed legal error by talcing from the jury the question of whether 
Appellant/Defendant Michael Jatnes Shannon was acting within the course and 
scope of his employment with Appellee/Defendant Ogden Auto Body at the time 
of the subject accident.1 Indeed, because Ogden Auto Body received a substantial 
benefit from and had control over Shannon at the time of the accident, the "coming 
and going" exception is ll}applicable. 
In response, Ogden Auto Body begins by arguing that the "undisputed facts" 
~ show that the "coming and going" exception applies in this case because Shannon 
was not fulfilling a task for it at the moment of the accident, and contends that the 
"coming and going" exception applies, as a matter of law, to all "on-call" 
employees who drive company vehicles outside of work hours, but are not actively 
responding to a service call. Ogden Auto Body also contends that the district court 
did not err in talcing the decision of whether Shannon was acting within the course 
1 Ogden Auto Body does not dispute that it bears the burden of proving that the 
"coming and going" exception applies in this case. See Appellant's Brief pp. 13 -
14. 
1 
and scope his employment from the jury because, as a matter of law, it did not 
receive a substantial benefit from having Shannon on-call and had no control over 
him at the time of the accident. 
B. Utah's "coming and going" exception to the doctrine of respondeat 
superior is only a general exception, which is not always 
applicable. 
Ogden Auto Body contends that the "coming and going" exception 
automatically applies to all on-call employees who drive company vehicles outside 
of work hours, but who are not actively responding to a service call at the time of 
the accident. Appellee's Brief p. 10. This blanket argument is an over generalized 
conclusion unsupported by case law. 
First, Ogden Auto Body's conclusion relies upon the outcome in Ahlstrom v. 
~ 
'·' 
Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, 73 P.3d 315, which was discussed in Hoskin's 
opening brief. In Ahlstrom, the Supreme Court applied the "coming and going" 
exception to an off-duty police officer who was involved in an accident while 
driving home with her infant son in a city owned police car, during off hours. 
Contrary to Ogden Auto Body's argument, the court did not suggest that the 
outcome in Ahlstrom applied in all on-call cases. First, the Supreme Court 
indicated that its application of the "coming and going" exception in that case was 
specific to police car cases: 
We may gleam from relevant opinions the conclusion that cities will 
not be liable for commuting officers' accidents in the absence of 
2 
Gw,, 
unique circumstances giving rise to a definite need for the officer to 
use the patrol car while off-duty. Thus a mere benefit to the city, or 
the city's exercise of some control over the use of the vehicle, is not 
enough to overcome the general premises of the coming and going 
rule. 
Id. at 18. 
Second, both Ahlstrom and applicable case law make it clear that whether 
the "coming and going" exception applies in a given case depends upon the 
circumstances of the particular case. Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4, at 1 8. 
Ogden Auto Body nonetheless contends, that as a blanket rule, "if an on-call 
employee is not actively pursuing his work duties (i.e., responding to a service 
call), then the coming-and-going rule applies to bar vicarious liability against the 
employer." Appellee's Brief p. 10. This conclusion is unsupported by Ogden Auto 
Body's cited case law, including Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986), 
Herndon v. Neil, 424 So.2d 1180 (La. Ct. App. 1982), and Short v. Miller, 304 
S.E.2d 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). Ogden Auto Body cites no non-police accident-
related case to support its argument that Shannon is required to have personal 
"unique" set of skills to overcome the "coming and going" exception. 
In Lane, an employee was driving his employer's van at the time of an 
accident. However, the employee first driven home after completing work, and 
then, hours later, drove to a bar. When he eventually drove home he was legally 
intoxicated. The accident occurred a total of seve~ hours after the employee had 
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left work. The court concluded that the employee "was not performing any act he 
was hired to perform and was not motivated in any way by a purpose to serve his 
employer at the time of the accident. Therefore as a matter of law, he was not 
acting within the scope of his employment at the time the accident occurred." Id 
( citations omitted). 
Similarly, in Herndon v. Neil, 424 So.2d 1180 (La. Ct. App. 1982), the 
Louisiana Court of Appeals found that the employee's "informal type of 'on-call' 
situation" placed him within the course and scope of employment. He closed the 
business at 9:00 a.m., left in a personal car, drove to a lounge to visit a girlfriend, 
and remained there until mid or late afternoon. "It would be ludicrous to say at the 
time of this accident Mr. Neil was in any way pursuing his duties as an 
employee .... " Id. 
Moreover, in Short v. Miller, 304 S.E.2d 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983), the 
employee, while on-call, went for a Saturday morning joy ride with a friend. The 
employee had not left any work location and was not required to identify where he 
could be reached. He was socializing, and was not pursuing any benefit for the 
employer. Id. at 434-435. 
The outcomes in these cases do not support an across-the-board conclusion 
that that the "coming-and going" exception applies unless an employee is 
responding to a service call. Instead, these cases show that the facts and particular 
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circumstances of each case must be examined individually. See Kinne v. Industrial 
Comm 'n, 609 P .2d 926, 927 (1980). 
In factual contrast to Ogden Auto Body's above-cited cases, Shannon had 
recently completed the final call for the day and was on his way home.2 He was 
performing an act that he was hired to perform and was primarily motivated by the 
purpose to serve his employer at the time of the accident, and his employer had 
control over him. Shannon was required to drive the truck home every day and to 
have the truck with him at all times. He complied with this mandatory 
requirement. Ogden Auto Body benefited from him having the truck in his 
possession, so he could respond to any and all calls during the evening and could 
leave directly from his house to respond to calls. The truck was not permitted to be 
used for any other purpose without explicit permission from Ogden Auto Body. 
Shannon complied with this rule and only used the truck for personal errands with 
permission from Ogden Auto Body's owner. Appellant's Brief pp. 5, 7. 
Ogden Auto Body attempts to draw similarities between this case and Lane, 
supra. However, the facts in this case are materially different. Unlike in Lane, 
Shannon did not first go home and then drive elsewhere to spent hours socializing 
2 Ogden Auto Body fails to acknowledge that in contrast with Lane, Herndon, and 
Short, the time that passed between Shannon's last call and the accident, was 
primarily travel time, while in these cited cases, many hours had passed and the 
employees were returning home from social activities. 
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or to use the tow truck for any personal use before the accident occurred. Instead, 
Shannon was performing an act he was hired to accomplish for the benefit of 
Ogden Auto Body. In further contrast to Lane, Shannon's decision to pick-up 
dinner at a drive-thru prior to the accident was only a minor deviation from his on-
call, in truck duties, which was both foreseeable and permitted by Ogden Auto 
Body (Appellant's Brief p. 9) and was an inevitable toll of a lawful enterprise and 
benefit it. See e.g. Lazar v. Thermal Equip. Corp., 148 Cal. App. 3d 458, 466-467 
(Cal. App. 2d Dist 1983) ( employee who was involved in an accident while on a 
detour to purchase food on the way home from work and driving the employer's 
vehicle. The detour was foreseeable and reasonable and permitted the application 
of the doctrine of respondeat superior); see also Wilson v. Edwards, 138 W. Va. 
613,637 (W. Va. 1953). 
Under the facts of this case, a reasonable juror could find that Ogden Auto 
Body was aware, and expected, that Shannon would use the tow truck to travel to 
and from drive-thrus to pick-up food while on call, traveling to and from work. 
There is no evidence that Shannon had any other objective in mind than a brief 
stop at a drive-thru, or that this was anything but a minor deviation from his route 
home. 
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C. The trial court erred in applying the "coming and going" 
exception in this case as a matter of law because a jury could find 
that Ogden Auto Body received a substantial benefit from and 
had control over Shannon at the time of the accident. 
Whether an injury arises out of or within the scope of employment depends 
on the particular circumstances of the case. Kinne, 609 P .2d at 927. In Ahlstrom, 
the Utah Supreme Court adopted a framework to determine whether the "coming 
and going" exception applies by weighing the benefit received and the control of 
the employer against the personal nature of the trip on a case by case basis. 
Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4, 1 9. The circumstances of Shannon's employment and 
conduct would permit a jury to apply exceptions to the "coming and going" 
exception based upon (1) the benefit received by Ogden Auto Body and (2) its 
control over Shannon's employment. 
1. Ogden Auto Body received a substantial benefit from 
Shannon driving its tow truck home. 
Ogden Auto Body contends that, as a matter of law, it did not receive a 
substantial benefit by having Shannon drive its tow truck home. Appellee's Brief 
pp. 12 -14 (citing Lane, 731 P.2d at 489-490). However, in this case, the benefit 
Ogden Auto Body received was much more than Shannon's ability to drive home. 
It was a vital necessity that Shannon drive the tow truck home nightly. Ogden 
Auto Body required its drivers to take their tow trucks home and remain on-call 
and ready in order to respond to service calls at all hours. 
7 
A jury could find that Shannon was providing a substantial benefit to his 
employer by being in possession of the tow truck 24 hours a day and remaining on-
call, as the employer itself required. The ability and urgency to quickly respond to 
Ogden Auto Body's clients directly affected its compensation and future business. 
Shannon's primary motivation for driving the tow truck home was to benefit 
Ogden Auto Body, by complying with its mandatory employment requirement to 
be able to timely respond to calls as soon as possible. In Lane, by contrast, the 
employee was performing no benefit at all for the employer at the time of the 
accident. Lane, 731 P.2d at 489-490. 
In short, Ogden Auto Body received the exact benefit that it demanded-the 
substantial benefit of having Shannon on-call and in possession of its tow truck 24 
hours a day to respond directly to any and all calls as needed. Shannon could not 
perform most of his work duties without the tow truck. It was a specialized truck 
which allowed him to service and tow vehicles. If Shannon did not have the tow 
truck, he could not have responded to calls during the time limitations required by 
Ogden Auto Body's clients. 
A reasonable juror could conclude that Ogden Auto Body failed to meet its 
burden of proof, particularly where Shannon regularly does receive calls while on-
call, regardless of the time of day, and would have responded ifhe had received a 
call the evening of the accident. Shannon's work history shows the significance of 
8 
his on-call status and the benefit Ogden Auto Body received by his retention of the 
-.J tow truck after hours. 3 The fact that Shannon had not (yet) received a call after 
hours on the day of the accident is not determinative of whether the coming and 
going exception applies. 
2. Ogden Auto Body retained control of Shannon while he 
drove its tow truck home. 
Ogden Auto Body retained control of Shannon while he remained in the 
truck. Shannon's job, as a salaried employee of Ogden Auto Body, was to be in 
and to drive the tow truck to service clients. He had no control over what vehicle 
he drove each day- he was required to drive Ogden Auto Body's tow truck, which 
it maintained and for which it paid all fuel. He had no control over when he'd 
receive a call and where Ogden Auto Body would send him. The tow truck was 
not interchangeable with other modes of transportation to fulfill his site-to-site 
service calls. Shannon's acceptance of a call at any time was mandatory, and he 
could not say no to any call unless he first obtained permission for time-off. 
Shannon also had no control of the location from which he would commence 
driving home. 
3 Between July 1, 2012 and December 1, 2012, Shannon completed 44 calls after 
7 :00 p.m. In the two months immediately preceding the accident, he cleared 26 
calls from Ogden Auto Body after 6:00 p.m. Of those calls, Shannon cleared 16 
calls after 7:00 pm and 7 calls after 8:00 p.m. Appellant's Brief pp. 6- 7. 
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On the other hand, Ogden Auto Body's control of Shannon gave it continual 
access to its tow truck and the tools to fulfill its services, and thus the continual 
ability and means to conduct its business at all hours.4 It used a GPS system to 
know the exact location of its trucks in relation to calls, regardless of the hour. 
Ogden Auto Body's control included its maintenance and paying for its fuel. 
Ogden Auto Body cites no case law with similar facts to justify taking the 
issue of control from the jury. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Ogden 
Auto Body retained control over Shannon while he remained in the tow truck, 
placing him within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the 
accident. A reasonable juror could conclude that Shannon was fulfilling a task for 
Ogden Auto Body, as directed at the time of the accident - by complying with its 
directive to take the tow truck home to support its business purposes. 
Accordingly, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Shannon was 
"involved wholly or partly in the performance of his master's business or within 
the scope of employment." Newman v. Whitewater Wh,irlpool, 2008 UT 79, at ,r 12 
(quoting Carter v. Bessey, 93 P.2d 490,493 (Utah 1939)). 
4 Call records show that Shannon responded to all of Ogden Auto Body's calls day 
and night, went where he was told to go, and remained on-call at all times. 
Shannon always complied with Ogden Auto Body's directives. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY RULING AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT THE "DUAL PURPOSE EXCEPTION" TO THE 
vJ "COMING AND GOING" EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS 
CASE 
A. Summary of primary and responsive arguments. 
Hoskins has argued that even if the "coming and going" exception does 
apply, the predominant purpose of Shannon's conduct was for Ogden Auto Body's 
benefit and his conduct meets the "dual purpose exception." Ogden Auto Body 
argues that the "dual purpose exception" does not apply in this case because 
viJ Shannon's predominant motivation and purpose at the moment of the accident was 
to return home and not to perform any immediate task for his employer. 
B. A jury could find that the "dual purpose exception" applies in this 
case. 
In Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insur. Co., 801 P .2d 934, 93 7 (Utah 
1989), the Utah Supreme Court adopted an analysis of the "dual purpose 
exception," examining the predominant motivation and purpose of the activity of 
the employee, and found that a "useful test" utilized to determine when an 
employee's conduct comes under the "dual purpose exception" is "whether the trip 
is one which would have required the employer to send another employee over the 
same route or to perform the same function if the trip had not been made." Id. at 
93 7 ( citations omitted). 
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The dual purpose exception applies in the present case. In the substance of 
its argument, Ogden Auto Body focuses solely on what Shannon would do once he 
arrived home._ This argument fails to acknowledge Shannon's motivation and 
purpose in driving the tow truck home, as he was doing at the time of the accident. 
The predominant purpose of Shannon's trip was for the benefit of Ogden Auto 
Body. His conduct was not personal. As long as he was in the tow truck, he was 
expected to respond to any and all calls. This was not a tangential benefit to 
Ogden Auto Body. As noted above, in order to retain its clientele, Ogden Auto 
Body required all of its drivers to take their tow trucks home and remain on-call at 
all hours. 
If Shannon had refused to either take the tow truck home or to respond to 
calls while in the truck or at home, Ogden Auto Body would have had to replace 
him with someone else to perform the exact same function. Contrary to Ogden 
Auto Body's contention, this was not a "tangential benefit." It was an essential 
benefit, which enabled Ogden Auto Body to meet its clientele's 20 to 30 minute 
response requirement at all hours of the day. It also allowed Shannon to leave his 
home and immediately be at work the moment he got into the truck. 
Moreover, Ogden Auto Body's argument that the predominant purpose and 
function of Shannon's commute was to pick-up food at Kneader's is unsupported 
by the record. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Shannon had any other 
12 
objective in mind than a brief stop at the drive-thru. Ogden Auto Body was aware, 
and expected, that Shannon would make minor deviations from his route to pick up 
meals and there is no evidence that his visit to a drive-thru was anything but a 
minor deviation from his route home. This minor deviation was both foreseeable 
and permitted by Ogden Auto Body, and was an inevitable toll of a lawful 
enterprise and the benefit given to Ogden Auto Body. See Lazar, 148 Cal.App.3d 
at 466-467; see also Wilson, 138 W.Va. at 637. 
Ill. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE 
~ "INSTRUMENTALITY EXCEPTION" IN THIS CASE 
I~ 
A. Summary of primary and responsive arguments. 
Hoskins has argued that "instrumentality exception" to the "coming and 
going" exception to vicarious liability should be applied in this case because a jury 
could find that Ogden Auto Body's control of Shannon outweighs the personal 
nature of his journey at the time of the accident. Ogden Auto Body argued that it 
derived no benefit from Shannon's drive home (other than having the tow truck 
available if needed) and had no control of how and when he arrived home. 
B. The "instrumentality exception" should be presented to the jury 
in this case. 
Application of the "instrumentality exception" in this case is in line with the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 cmt. d (1958), and the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Bailey v. Utah State Indus. Comm 'n., 398 P.2d 545 (Utah 
13 
1965).5 Contrary to Ogden Auto Body's argument, Vanleeuwen v. Industrial 
Comm'n. of Utah, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) is disparate from the present 
case, the only similarity being that the employer furnished the employee with a 
company vehicle. In Vanleeuwen, however, the primary benefit to the employer 
was the employee's mere arrival at work, which not a substantial benefit to the 
employer. Id. at 282. (Citation omitted). The employee was not required to 
perform any job-related service or use the vehicle as a business instrumentality 
while traveling to and from the employer's business office. In the present case, the 
tow truck was not merely a vehicle used for Shannon to drive to and from work. It 
was his office and provided the instruments to perform his work. The moment he 
is in the tow truck, he is at work, and Ogden Auto Body had substantial control 
h. 6 over 1m. 
5 Ogden Auto Body quotes Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 cmt. d, which 
states: "The mere fact that the employer supplies a vehicle does not establish that 
those who avail themselves of it are within the scope of employment while upon it, 
especially if the use is merely casual." But a jury could easily find that Shannon's 
purpose in driving the tow truck the evening of the accident was not "merely 
casual." Ogden Auto Body's reliance on Restatement (Second) of Agency § 23 5 
("an act of a servant is n(?t within the scope of employment if it is done with no 
intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he is 
employed") is similarly not applicable in the present case. 
6 Ogden Auto Body argues that the instrumentality exception should not be applied 
in the present case because it was not applied in Ahlstrom. See Appellee' s Brief p. 
24. · However, the "instrumentality exception" was not before the court in 
Ahlstrom. Accordingly, Ogden Auto Body's argument is irrelevant. 
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IV. A JURY COULD FIND THAT OGDEN AUTO BODY RATIFIED 
SHANNON'S CONDUCT. 
A. Summary of primary and responsive arguments. 
Hoskins argued that even if Shannon was not initially within the course and 
scope of his employment, an issue of fact exists regarding whether Ogden Auto 
Body is liable under respondeat superior based on its post-accident ratification of 
Shannon's actions. Ogden Auto Body argued that there is no authority in Utah or 
elsewhere supporting the application of ratification to hold it vicariously liable for 
~ the negligent act of Shannon outside the course and scope of his employment. 
Ogden Auto Body also contends that its actions are insufficient as a matter of law 
to amount to ratification of Shannon's actions. 
B. Utah case law recognizes the application of ratification to hold an 
employer Liable for the Negligent Acts of an Employee. 
Ogden Auto Body contends that there is no authority in Utah or elsewhere 
supporting the application of the doctrine of ratification to hold it vicariously liable 
for the negligent act of Shannon outside the course and scope of his employment. 
This position is contrary to Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co., 17 P.2d 256, 259 
(1932), where the requirements for ratification were established in a negligence 
case. Ogden Auto Body does not dispute that Utah law recognizes the application 
of ratification in employment cases. See Jones, 17 P.2d at 259; see also Bradshaw 
v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982); Restatement (3d.) of Agency§ 7.04. 
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Ogden Auto Body also contends that Shannon was not "actively doing 
anything else for its benefit when he hit Mr. Hoskins." This argument ignores that 
at the time of the accident, Shannon was complying with mandatory job 
requirements to take the tow truck home, and Ogden Auto Body received the 
benefit by requiring the tow truck be taken home for business purposes. 
Ogden Auto Body finally contends that ratification should not be applied in 
this case because the courts in the cases of Lane, Whitehead, Ahlstrom, and 
Newman did not apply it. Ratification was not argued as a theory for vicarious 
liability in any of those cases; however, accordingly, Ogden Auto Body's 
contention is incorrect. 
C. There is a factual dispute whether Ogden Auto Body ratified 
Shannon's actions. 
Regardless of whether Shannon was initially acting with the course and 
scope of his employment, an issue of fact exists regarding whether Ogden Auto 
Body is liable under respondeat superior based on its post-accident ratification of 
Shannon's actions. Ogden Auto Body contends that the doctrine of ratification 
does not apply because "[m]ere continuance of employment after the accident is 
insufficient to show the approval necessary to trigger liability, and legal 
representation in a court proceeding does not constitute ratification. 
Hoskins does not dispute that continued employment "standing alone, 
cannot be sufficient to find ratification." Hughes v. Rivera-Ortiz, 187 N.C. App. 
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214, 653 S.E.2d 165 (2007), aff'd in part, 362 N.C. 501, 666 S.E.2d 751 (2008). 
However, Ogden Auto Body fails to address the additional facts justifying 
ratification in the present case, including the undisputed fact that Ogden Auto 
VJJ) Body had actual knowledge of material facts surrounding the accident, and paid 
Shannon's citation. Moreover, Ogden Auto Body failed to reprimand or take any 
disciplinary action against Shannon. 7 
CONCLUSION 
Hoskins respectfully urges the Court to reverse the trial court's Order 
Granting Defendant Ogden Auto Body's Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
Hoskins' respondeat superior claim, and remand this case for trial. 
DATED this 8th day of March, 2016. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Scott P. Evans 
Stephen D. Kelson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
7 Ogden Auto Body's reliance upon Maier v. Patterson, 553 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Pa. 
1982) for the general position that an employer has no duty to discipline an 
employee is unsupported. In that case, the employer (a Union) could not initiate 
disciplinary action without a Plaintiff first activating the disciplinary action in 
filing a complaint. Id. at 155. Failure to discipline is at least one factor that a jury 
may consider on the issue of ratification. 
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